In the decade of the 1990s, following the Cold War, the phrase “tech transfer” was often used in a positive way to denote technology transferred from the military sector to the commercial marketplace. This was the ideal, a way to tap into the underutilized domain of supposedly limitless potential in which laid-off defense workers might find their second (employment) wind – and defense companies might stay afloat as new ways of doing business fortuitously emerged.
Outside the ideal, in a practical sense it also meant transferring some capabilities abroad, including to China.
This was not, in itself, unusual: Silicon Valley’s semiconductor manufacturers had been building up China since the late 1980s, creating jobs there and increased shareholder value at home – while rendering domestic manufacturing and its skilled workers obsolete.
After the Cold War, satellite manufacturers including Boeing and Space Systems/Loral began selling commercial communications satellites to China. This appeared to be a valuable opportunity to transfer non-sensitive technology to a commercial market while saving American jobs that would otherwise be lost due to the Peace Dividend.
But not all technology transfers proceed as planned. In February 1996, a Chinese Long March rocket carrying Loral’s Intelsat 708 crashed following liftoff, the third such failure in 38 months of a Long March rocket with an American-made satellite payload. The subsequent investigation by Loral engineers generated concern that personnel working to determine the cause of the launch failure ended up improving the ballistic missile defense capability of the People’s Republic of China.
In engineering problem-solving, it is generally accepted that failure – while painful – can be a very effective teacher. A disciplined, methodical approach to answer the question “What went wrong?” will, without a doubt, lead some into solution pathways that could result in putting sensitive information at risk. At that point, it is the responsibility of management – most of whom began their careers as engineers – to deploy an iron grip on communications and the distribution of results.
This did not happen. According to government documents, Loral’s review activity “was not authorized by any U.S. Government export license or Technical Assistance Agreement.”
Something failed along the chain. This situation would have been far less likely during the Cold War – unless an individual specifically wanted to cause harm. Companies with defense contracts were supposed to be extremely careful about the other projects they pursued, making sure that the government was fully informed and on board.
Tech transfer had gotten out of hand.
The case was eventually settled by Loral’s payment to the U.S. government of a $14 million fine for export violations. Its CEO, top Clinton donor Bernard Schwartz, “neither admitted nor denied the government’s charges” of violating export rules, according to the Los Angeles Times.
Tech transfer involving the Russians was more nuanced. While the Soviet state had failed, its theoretical scientists and mathematicians were considered top-notch by many in the West. This was not a case of propagandists reciting “best and brightest” mantras in order to gain American jobs – it was a documented reality. In fact, the Space Race officially began in the Soviet Union, and the first astronaut launched was Russian.
Their computer skills lagged behind, however, and U.S. training improved them, with the near-term goal of keeping Russian nuclear scientists away from employment in unfriendly countries or with non-state actors. (Note that no similar effort had been pursued domestically to help our scientists gain software jobs.)
U.S. and Russian teams also collaborated in scientific studies, including in topics related to missile defense. In one effort, a joint U.S.-Russian team observed phenomena similar to those generated by high-velocity impacts above the atmosphere, with the U.S. providing the rocket and the Russians, the explosive payload. And from 1993, the U.S. and Russia collaborated on the International Space Station.
As current tensions over Ukraine demonstrate, scientific exchanges do not override the need for an amicable political relationship between the parties involved. Making tech transfer a priority after the Cold War, we’d entered a new reality whose political turf had not yet settled. And by quickly gutting our defense industry, we’d burned the boats.
In the end, we’d helped the Chinese improve their rocketry, and the Russians their software skills and scientific knowledge.
But a lasting peace? Thirty years after the fact, it is not a good look.
