A generation ago, the Army’s “Jedi Knights,” graduates of the elite School of Advanced Military Studies, enjoyed an international reputation as perhaps the world’s best campaign planners. Carefully selected and highly talented, these officers played major roles in the stunning success of the Gulf War. Since then, the program has lost much of its swagger. What happened?
The short answer is that SAMS got too big. Beginning with a crack group of 13 officers, it has since expanded more than ten-fold and is open to officers of all branches (including reservists, chaplains, physicians, personnel specialists and finance officers), warrant officers, sister service, interagency and foreign students, dulling its focus and diluting its quality. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) was founded in 1983 as a follow-on to the resident Command and General Staff College course for selected students. Lasting one academic year, its founding charter was to provide the Army with a small pool of hand-picked, exceptional officers schooled in military campaigning. (A heavy focus on “operational art” came later) Notably, “SAMS was not intended to be a course of indoctrination for planning specialists. Rather, it was intended as a course for generalists who would lead the Army in every way, especially intellectually.”
Today there are hundreds of SAMS graduates, but hard data justifying a strong return on investment is lacking. While valued for their grasp of the intricacies of the Army’s famous “military decision making process” and as hard-working staff officers, today’s SAMS graduates do not enjoy the glamour, prestige, or success of earlier cohorts. None of the Army’s current four-stars attended SAMS.
Nevertheless, the selection, development, and employment of a very small number of outstanding officers in the most critical staff positions in the field army offers real promise. In concept such a program would not incur significant costs or disrupt Army personnel policies to any marked degree, as the number of officers involved would be quite small. What would such a program look like?
First, requirements for admission should be strict and demanding. High cognitive ability, defined as “the ability to understand abstract concepts and ideas, to reason accurately, and to solve problems” is the first and most important criterion. Given a well-documented “anti-intellectual bias” rooted deeply in Army organizational culture, any candidate must also be a proven and successful troop leader, able to compete and thrive in the demanding world of leadership in combat formations. This is an important point. A groundbreaking study published in 2015 concluded that, with otherwise equal qualifications, Army officers possessing cognitive ability one standard deviation higher than the norm were significantly disadvantaged in selection for early promotion and command. Any program that singles out bright young officers for special opportunities will attract opposition from many quarters. For this reason, high intelligence and prestigious academic credentials are not enough. Strong character and excellence as a troop leader in combat formations are equally important.
After graduation the officer would return to troops for service as a division chief of operations or chief of plans, followed by service with troops as a field grade officer. Assuming success in these billets, the officer should be highly competitive for selection for battalion command. Following successful battalion command, the officer would move up for duty as division G3, a billet specifically coded for program graduates, followed by brigade command –a performance- based selection and not a set-aside for program graduates. In lieu of war college, the officer would attend a one year, mid-career graduate program in national security studies at a demanding top-tier institution, leading to a graduate degree. This experience will help ground the officer in strategy-making within the larger national security enterprise, providing an in-depth understanding of the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) as well as the interagency process.
Post-brigade command, the officer would serve as a division chief of staff or corps G3, assignments again reserved for program graduates. In this way, division and corps commanders could be assured of competent, high performing staffs led by officers of proven talent and uncommon ability. On the strength of these assignments, and again contingent on superior performance, these officers would compete well for promotion to general officer and selection for higher commands, as well as key chief of staff, operations and strategy billets in higher level Army and Joint organizations. These opportunities should attract the Army’s very best.
A program of this type would face opposition and would require sustained support from senior Army leaders. Champions will be needed, and officers selected must embody key traits most desirable in the operations officers and chiefs of staff of the Army’s divisions and corps: first, high intelligence; second, proven credentials as superb troop leaders and staff officers in combat formations; and finally, strong character of the most decided kind, dedicated to the profession, selfless and modest yet firm in action and ready at all times to shoulder responsibility.
Should Army leaders decide to adopt this model, a return to the original SAMS concept is the most promising and cost-effective option. Slimming down the program to its original format will draw opposition but offers the best promise of realizing its true potential. The price for selecting and developing the Army’s very best is not high. Not many officers will fit the bill. Those that do can make enormous contributions to victory – in the end, the only outcome that truly matters.
R.D. Hooker Jr. is a Senior Fellow with The Atlantic Council. A career Army officer, he served three tours on the National Security Council and commanded a parachute brigade in Iraq.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
